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PREFACE
At 6:57 a.m. in Missoula, Montana on September 11, 2 001 ,1 awoke to a phone call from 
my mother. I remember the exact time because the tone of her voice was so urgent, her 
message so horrifying: “Turn on the television, quick. An airplane just hit the World 
Trade Center.” She was in shock. I scrambled for the remote control. Unable to find it, I 
stretched from bed and pressed the power-button with my finger. The image, as so many 
have described it, was surreal: New York’s twin towers standing side by side, black 
smoke billowing from one. I watched, frozen. Suddenly an object streaked across the 
screen and exploded into the other building. “What airline?” I screamed. “What airline?”
It is a strange question to ask at such a moment, I know. But when your father is 
an airline pilot it is the only question after learning of a crash. My father is a captain for 
the Delta Shuttle. In a typical day he might fly in and out of New York’s LaGuardia 
Airport, across the East River from the World Trade Center, four or five times, so for a 
few terrifying moments on Sept.l 11 didn’t know where he was or if he was even alive. 
Fortunately, I found out later that he was not working at the time but I knew his life 
would never be the same.
The World Trade Center was perhaps the most prominent landmark on a pilot’s 
flight into New York City. Approaching LaGuardia from Boston’s Logan Airport on a 
clear day my dad, said he could see the two towers scraping the sky from 20 miles out. 
Then he would turn toward the mouth of the Hudson River, dropping down near the 
Statue of Liberty and circling around the W orld Trade Center’s 110-story towers once 
before setting his plane down on runway 4. The pattern he flies into New York City since
111
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Sept. 11 is the same as it was before but now when he lands he always looks down on the 
void in lower Manhattan, unable to forget what happened there.
In the weeks after the attacks, I remained glued to the 24-hour news networks and 
read hundreds of column inches about the airline industry’s violent transformation: U.S. 
military fighters patrolled the skies over American cities prepared to shoot down a 
hijacked airliner that threatened lives and property on the ground; there was talk of 
arming pilots with handguns; and the industry was bleeding millions of dollars a day, 
putting the jobs of hundreds of thousands of airline employees in jeopardy. Obviously, 
for me, the attacks struck pretty close to home. For a professional project for my M aster’s 
degree in journalism I was compelled to write about the sudden change in my father’s 
profession.
Originally, I intended to do kind of pop-psychology account of how pilots were 
dealing with post-Sept. 11 pressures in a career already known for its high level of stress. 
But in a conversation with my father last fall he deflected the story from himself. He said, 
“If you want to know how some of Delta’s employees handle pressure, you should talk to 
the people who were working at the OCC that day; they did an incredible job.”
The OCC is Delta’s central command center. Dad explained that although his 
airline had escaped the horrors of United and American on Sept. 11, it still faced a 
logistical nightmare. After the second plane hit the south tower Delta’s chief flight 
controller shut down the airline, several minutes before the government closed U.S. 
airspace nationwide. All of a sudden, flight dispatchers and pilots had to coordinate the 
landing of no fewer than 400 planes carrying at least 30,000 passengers. Some landed in 
places as remote as Santa Maria in the Azores, stranding passengers and crews; and, after
I V
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the government opened airspace 5 days later. Delta had to restart the massive operations 
it had ground to a virtual instant halt. But before the airline could recover a single plane, 
engineers and security analysts had to develop new security procedures and technology to 
prevent another catastrophe. Clearly the OCC’s response was vital to the story, but I 
knew there was more.
In the weeks following Sept. 11,1 talked to Delta pilots, flight attendants and 
engineers to get their reaction to the day that changed their profession forever; and in 
March I went to Delta’s headquarters in Atlanta for four days to see the OCC and its 
support resources function in person. Delta’s experience is part of the larger story of the 
aviation industry’s triumphs and mistakes, and it offers a rare glimpse into the minds of 
an extraordinary team of professionals— by no means all of them pilots— whose jobs 
depend on cool confidence and quick thinking.
My father’s job and my status as a student allowed me a level of access at Delta 
that would have otherwise been impossible. When a reporter from the Washington Post 
or the Wall Street Journal, for example, visits Delta he is accompanied by a public 
relations manager I was not. Nor did I surrender any editorial privileges. On the contrary, 
most of the people I talked to recognized that for better or worse they are part of a new 
world order, and asked only that I tell their stories fairly.
A journalist’s role as a “watchdog” for abuses of power in our democracy requires 
vigorous skepticism, but another role of journalism is to record the experiences of people 
as they cope with change. The instant American Airlines Flight 11 sliced into the World 
Trade Center’s north tower at 8:45 a.m. on Sept. 11, one world ended and a new more 
dangerous one began, a struggle in which the people of the airline industry are on the
V
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front lines of and one where life for all Americans will never be the same. Whatever the 
airlines’ past failings, the responsibilities of the men and women I observed at 
Delta— and of those who do their jobs at every airline— are enormous and they deserve to 
have their stories told.
VI
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I. DELTA HEADQUARTERS
Outside the headquarters of Delta Air Lines Inc., near Atlanta’s Hartsfield International 
Airport, almost six months to the day after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, a guard inspected 
my father’s and my credentials and looked us up and down. We cleared the first security 
perimeter but just a few steps inside another guard asked us to prove we were supposed to 
be there. My father is a pilot for Delta and we had come to see Capt. Dan Yates, an old 
family friend and a special project manager in the airline’s flight operations department, 
to find out how Delta was coping with the aftermath of the attacks. Although I ’d only 
been at headquarters a few minutes I ’d begun to appreciate that flying in this country will 
never be quite the same.
The headquarters consist of three five-story brick buildings connected by two 
pedestrian bridges on the outside and a maze of hallways on the inside. Operation 
Control-3 houses multi-million dollar flight simulators capable of challenging a novice 
pilot with just about any scenario his instructor can dream up. Operation Control-2 is 
filled with classrooms and Hollywood-style airplane sets used to train flight crews for 
emergencies in as realistic an environment as possible, right up to the air-sickness bags 
stuffed in pretend seat-back pockets. Operation Control-1 is home to the Operation 
Control Center (OCC), the cerebrum of the nation’s third largest airline. The OCC is 
divided into 17 departments each with a distinct area of expertise but all inextricably 
connected. Here, mathematicians, meteorologists, pilots, engineers, economists, flight 
dispatchers and security analysts, to name just a few of the positions, determine the safest 
and most cost-effective way to operate 2,200 flights to over 500 cities worldwide, 24- 
hours a day, seven days a week.
1
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While the long-term effects of Sept. 11 on the country remain largely uncertain, 
the attacks have already transformed the airline industry: flights had to be reduced; 
cockpit doors were strengthened against attackers trying to get at the controls inside; 
airport security was heightened; and the cost of it all has left the future of some airlines 
hanging in the balance. With Yates’ guidance (and his security clearance) I would 
observe several key features of Delta’s operations over the next four days— from security 
briefings at the Flight Operations department to the floor of the OCC to a ride in a Boeing 
767-400 flight simulator—to see how these changes are being felt at Delta. The airline’s 
experience is part of the larger story of the industry’s triumphs and mistakes, and it offers 
a rare glimpse into the minds of a team now charged with keeping the skies safe.
On the surface, the flight operations department could have been any other office 
space in Atlanta: A sea of wall-to-wall carpet filled with cubicles and surrounded by 
offices and conference rooms on every side save one left open to let in the Georgia sun. 
But the employees at “Flight Ops” are hardly typical. Most are pilots, many with 
advanced degrees in business or engineering and many are also retired military officers 
with strong leadership skills and a knack for order. Flight Ops is a liaison between 
management and Delta’s 9,800 or so pilots on issues ranging from the operational safety 
of aircraft to contract negotiations. However, since Sept. 11, it has been focused primarily 
on security.
When I arrived at Yates’ half-opened office door, an assistant was inside briefing 
him about a forthcoming meeting with federal air marshals. 1 could hear his calm, 
articulate voice: “I ’ll have to move some things around but we need to discuss our 
operations at National.” My father met Yates about 10 years ago in Boston when they
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
were both flying 727s. He also holds a M aster’s degree in electrical engineering from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. After a stint as chief pilot for the Delta Shuttle in 
New York City Yates was asked to come to Atlanta as something of a utility infielder for 
Flight Ops. He has published numerous articles in Delta’s aviation safety journal Up 
Front on issues such as windshear (a violent meteorological phenomena that has resulted 
in several commercial airline crashes over the years) and jet engine fuel efficiency.
His office is Spartan in appearance. The first thing I noticed was that the 
computer monitor on top of his steel desk was draped with green camouflage netting “just 
in case of an air-raid,’’ he said sarcastically. Unopened cardboard boxes were stacked in 
comers. On the wall behind his desk were steel cabinets with three die cast model 
jetliners on top; and on the wall in front of his desk a dry-erase board sported a quote 
from Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar:
Cry Havoc ! And 
let loose the dogs of war. That this 
foul deed should 
smell above the 
earth with carrion men 
groaning for burial.
-Marc Anthony
Early last September Yates had put aside his managerial responsibilities to return 
to training so he could remain proficient as a pilot even as his career brought him further 
away from the cockpit. But after the attacks. Delta pulled the brainy 43-year-old out of 
the classroom and put him back in his office. Except for weekend trips to see his wife and 
two small children in Duxbury, Mass., he has been living out of a hotel room ever since. 
Suddenly, Delta needed one of its best problem solvers to help fix a security system that
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nobody knew was so terribly broken. I ’m jumping ahead, however, to the world that 
began after American Airlines Flight 11 exploded into the World Trade Center at 
8:45a.m. Delta’s story begins earlier on Sept. 11, inside a hanger at Boston’s Logan 
airport.
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II. TH E  ATTACKS
It was a perfect day, 70 degrees and clear blue skies, perfect for a leisurely “ferry” flight 
to Cincinnati. Mike James, a Delta 737-800 co-pilot met Capt. Pat O ’Connor at 7:30a.m, 
inside a hanger adjacent to Logan’s international terminal E. After a pre-flight inspection 
the two pilots settled into the cockpit and ground crew workers kicked chocks, holding 
the plane in place, out from behind its giant wheels. James and O ’Connor were supposed 
to have left Boston the day before but a mechanical problem delayed the flight by 24 
hours, so they had received a new fight plan to fly the repaired plane, given the flight 
number 9930, empty of passengers to Cincinnati. At 7:45a.m. O ’Connor maneuvered the 
737 into the long line of aircraft forming on taxiways for Logan’s morning departures. 
Several planes ahead, on American Airlines Flight 11, Mohamed Atta and four other 
passengers in rows 2, 8 and 10— two in pairs and one alone were making final 
preparations to hijack the plane shortly after takeoff.
At 7:59a.m. Flight 11, a 767 with 81 passengers and 11 crew, departed runway 9, 
climbing out into an offshore breeze before turning west for Los Angeles. James and 
O ’Connor were close behind. They had flown the route dozens of times before and the 
two pilots had over 40 years of flying experience between them, but nothing could have 
prepared them for what was about to happen. As they climbed to a cruising altitude of 
35,000 feet, over western Massachusetts, James looked down on the Adirondacks and 
saw that the leaves were just beginning to change color. It was the kind of morning that 
reminded him of why he became a pilot. But soon a bizarre call from Boston’s control 
center would change his mood: Delta 9930, I  don 't know how to tell you this so I ’m just
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going to tell you. There’s an American 767 w e ’re not talking to with its transponder shut 
ojf. Its last altitude was 29,000feet, and we think its headed right at you.
A transponder sends a radio signal reporting a plane’s altitude, airspeed and 
heading to air traffic control. So after Atta, who authorities believe was flying the plane, 
turned the transponder off, Flight 11’s exact location was unknown. Moments later near 
Albany, N.Y, James saw the silver 767 about 5,000 or 6,000 feet beneath him racing east. 
James was probably the first person to see Flight 11 after it was hijacked. He reported its 
altitude and heading to Boston Center. At first, James thought the plane may have lost 
electrical power and was headed back for an emergency landing. But immediately 
O ’Connor knew something more sinister was afoot. He reminded James that the 767 had 
a wind driven generator fan that pops out in case of total electrical failure. Even if the 
plane had lost both its engines it still would have had enough power to run the 
transponder. James and O ’Connor continued west, listening closely to the radio.
At 8:45a.m. James heard Boston Center erupt into commotion: “You can hear the 
background noise at the center on the radio. After Flight 11 hit the World Trade Center I 
could hear yelling and screaming every time a controller keyed his mike.” Controllers 
announced that a plane had flown into the World Trade Center and put aircraft near New 
York City in a holding pattern. “I thought, my God, I bet it was that American 767,” 
James said. Fifteen minutes later United Flight 175 ripped into the south tower.
Immediately after the second plane hit, Joe Turner, Delta’s chief flight dispatcher, 
gave the order to shut down the airline. Several minutes later, the government grounded 
all civil aircraft nationwide. Initially there was no way to know if Delta had lost a plane 
or if more attacks were planned on flights already in progress. Turner’s order sent Delta’s
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flight dispatchers into action, scanning their screens to account for every single Delta 
plane and then to land it quickly, wherever it happened to be. At that time in the morning 
Delta had more planes aloft than any other airline— some 400 aircraft carrying no fewer 
than 30,000 passengers scattered in the skies around the world.
O ’Connor and James were ordered to continue to Cincinnati, full throttle. But 
when O ’Connor began to slow the plane for landing, about 20 miles from the airport, the 
flaps wouldn’t budge. The 737-400 is equipped with a device that prevents one flap from 
lowering farther than the other. So if both flaps aren’t working precisely, pilots have to 
configure the plane for a special emergency landing. James pulled out a quick-reference 
guide and immediately flipped to the section covering asymmetrical flap landings. 
Cincinnati’s air traffic control noticed 9930 was a little slow on its approach, and fearing 
the worst, asked James to confirm that he was not being hijacked. “It took a little 
convincing on my part but I explained that we had a flap problem and would be landing 
shortly,’’ James said.
Flap asymmetry is pretty rare. Most pilots only practice for the problem in a 
simulator, but James had just returned from training and the procedure was still fresh in 
his mind. He quickly ran through the emergency checklist for O ’Connor, who landed the 
plane safely at 10:11a.m. James and O ’Connor were fortunate to get a place at one of the 
airport’s gates, which were quickly filling up with the dozens of unscheduled flights 
landing in Cincinnati. Still reeling from what had just happened, James and O ’Connor 
walked through the airport to the crew lounge, where a television was on. They watched 
the W orld Trade Center’s two towers crumble to the ground.
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Hundreds of other Delta flights headed west from the East Coast also made 
impromptu landings in places like Cleveland and Des Moines. At first Delta Flight 1989, 
a 767 departing Boston for Los Angeles at approximately 8 a.m., came under particular 
scrutiny from law enforcement because it closely resembled two of the hijacked planes. 
(American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 were both 767s departing 
Boston for Los Angeles at around 8:00 a.m.) But Flight 1989 landed safely in Cleveland 
at approximately 9:50a.m. No evidence has been found to suggest terrorists were on 
board or that any attacks were planned on the flight.
With U.S. airspace closed, dozens more Delta aircraft bound from Europe that 
were east of 30 degrees latitude returned to the continent; aircraft west of 30 degrees 
latitude continued on to the Azores, Bermuda and the Canadian Maritimes. Delta landed 
all of its planes on Sept. 11 without any major incidents, but for Yates and many at the 
airline, the hard work was just beginning. “In many ways getting our planes down was 
the easy part,” Yates said. “Far more complicated was getting them back in the air.”
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III. NEW THREATS
The terrorist attacks had made it clear that the industry’s old strategy for dealing with 
terrorists was obsolete. While the FA A’s pre-Sept. 11 “common strategy” for hijackings 
remains classified, it is clear pilots were instructed to cooperate with hijackers to avoid an 
incident that could result in damage to flight control or injury to passengers. It was 
assumed that a terrorist would allow the aircraft to be landed where he would make 
demands and law enforcement could take over— a tragic misconception that will haunt 
many in the industry for the rest of their lives.’
By the afternoon of Sept. 11 Yates had assembled a security task force to address 
the new threats. The task force attacked the problem on two fronts: a procedural group, 
responsible for developing new strategies and communicating the information to flight 
crews, and a technical group, responsible for investigating structural modifications of 
aircraft. On Sept 12, Yates and the procedural team made up of pilots, flight attendants, 
engineers and security experts worked almost 24 hours nonstop drafting a memorandum 
that outlined new procedures needed before a single plane could again rise to the sky. 
With its passengers and crews stranded at airports around the world, and the company 
bleeding millions of dollars a day, Delta couldn’t wait to act.
The memo addressed many new security procedures that would make national 
headlines in the weeks to follow: security access at airports; verification of employee 
credentials; restricted access to the cockpit during flight; and air defense maneuvers that
'It is inconceivable to the em ployees I spoke to that the pilots o f  the hijacked planes w illingly allow ed the 
terrorists to get behind the controls. In cell phone calls from United Flight 93 (the hijacked plane that 
crashed in a Pennsylvania farm field) passengers reported seeing their pilots' bodies lying in the aisle, 
lifeless. One pilot said the terrorists probably knew a com m ercial airline pilot would only surrender a 
plane’s controls over his dead body. The new procedure is also classified but it is safe to say never again 
w ill flight crew s acquiesce to a hijacker’s demands.
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could be used by pilots to subdue a hijacker. However, Flight Ops still needed to get the 
new procedures to flight crews, some of who were staying at private homes in places 
Delta normally doesn’t even fly to. The terrorist attacks made reaching their pilots in 
secrecy a paramount concern. “We didn’t want to send our brand new security strategy to 
a public fax machine in a general aviation terminal or hotel lobby, ” Yates said. When 
possible, Yates sent the memo to secure control rooms at airports, but keeping it secret in 
remote locations required more ingenuity.
In Gander, Newfoundland, for example, Yates enlisted the help of the Royal 
Canadian Mounted police to deliver the memo. Delta set down 26 trans-Atlantic jets at 
Gander’s airport that usually only sees a handful of flights per day. On Sept. 11 its 
taxiways were crammed with aircraft sitting wing-to-wing, filled with thousands of weary 
passengers. The small fishing community simply did not have the infrastructure to handle 
thousands of visitors. Accommodations was needed by passengers and crew, customs 
officials were needed to process hundreds of foreign nationals and law enforcement was 
needed to address the possibility that so-called sleeper terrorists were on board some of 
the flights.
Law enforcement and customs officials were brought in from other parts of 
Canada and the United States to assist with the legal situation. And the people of Gander 
opened their homes and public buildings to the stranded travelers for five days. Some of 
the captains took on the roles of leaders and ambassadors, staying in contact by radio and 
cell phone with the OCC and disseminating information to Canadian officials and 
passengers as it became available. The generosity shown by the people of Gander “stood
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in sharp contrast to the inhumanity of the terrorist attacks that had brought so many to 
their shores,” Yates remarked.
Capt. Michael Quiello, a calm, meticulous man headed the technical group 
created after the attacks. On the morning of Sept. 11 the former A-6 Intruder flyer in the 
Marine Corps was in his office when his son called from Washington, D C., to ask him 
what he thought was going on at the World Trade Center. His son is a congressional aide 
on Capitol Hill and in the middle of their conversation American Airlines Flight 77 hit 
the Pentagon at 9:40a.m. Immediately, the Capitol building was evacuated and Quiello 
didn’t talk to his son again until later that afternoon. But the pilot had to put his concerns 
as a father aside for the time being because suddenly every single cockpit door in the 
nation was obsolete.
As soon as reports that terrorists had burst into cockpits on the hijacked flights 
emerged, Quiello began designing a strengthened cockpit door. The work involved in 
retrofitting an aircraft with even the smallest part, he well knew, would be extensive. One 
problem was that there simply is not enough real estate in a modem cockpit to make 
significant alterations. Another problem was that the new door would still have to allow 
pilots to escape in the event of a crash. But the most serious obstacle involved the 
complex issue of cabin pressurization.
A commercial airliner gradually pressurizes its fuselage as it climbs, so at high 
altitudes passengers and crew can breathe comfortably in the thin air; valves release 
pressure as the plane descends. At 37,000 feet above sea level the atmospheric pressure 
inside a standard airliner is kept approximately equal to the pressure at 6,300 feet above 
sea level or 8.6 pounds per square inch. While this air pressure is perfectly comfortable
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for passengers and crew to breathe, held inside a sealed tube soaring at the fringes of the 
troposphere, it creates the potential for a rapid decompression accident.
In the weeks after Sept. 11 it was not widely reported that airliners’ old cabin 
doors were designed to be frangible for a good reason. If a cockpit sealed with an airtight 
door were to experience a cracked windscreen, the force of the greater air pressure in the 
cabin equalizing with the suddenly lower air pressure in the cockpit could cause a violent 
decompression.
An incident aboard a British Airways BAC-111 out of Birmingham, England, in 
1990 well illustrates the danger. Shortly after take-off the plane’s windscreen— later 
discovered to have been fastened with the wrong bolts by mechanics two days 
earlier— shook loose and fell away. The explosive rush of air sucked the captain out from 
under his seatbelt, but a flight attendant in the cockpit was able to grab and hold onto his 
legs, eventually pulling him back inside. The co-pilot, who was fully restrained at the 
time of the decompression, landed the plane safely in Southhampton, England. 
Remarkably, the captain suffered only frostbite and a few broken bones.
The new cockpit door would thus have to simultaneously keep intruders intent on 
crashing the plane out while letting air pass without difficulty between the cabin and 
flight deck. After the government opened U.S. airspace, five days after the attacks,
Quiello led a team of Delta engineers and test pilots to a meeting at the Boeing aircraft 
manufacturing company near Seattle. During the flight they feverishly scribbled ideas for 
a stronger cockpit door into notebooks to share with federal aviation officials, major 
airline representatives and manufacturers.
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I looked at a binder filled with some of the designs generated at the Boeing 
meeting. One placed a Kevlar cargo net in front of the cockpit— allowing air to flow 
effortlessly while preventing unauthorized entry. Another zigzagged steel wire across the 
opening to the flight deck, but both designs left pilots susceptible if a terrorist somehow 
smuggled a firearm on board and both required tremendous time and money to install on 
the nation’s entire commercial fleet.
The Boeing meeting settled on a simple device that, in retrospect, probably should 
have been present all along: a steel security bar that could be installed on pre-existing 
cockpit doors. The engineers were concerned the bar might interfere with cabin air trying 
to equalize with air in the cockpit, so they performed a risk analysis. In the previous 50 
years of commercial aviation, they discovered, only two aircraft had been lost to a 
decompression accident.^ Compared with the sobering number of planes lost in the 
previous week— four—to forced cockpit entries the engineers reasoned a greater risk 
existed with an unlocked cockpit door. With the nation’s entire commercial fleet sitting 
idle at airports around the world and the airlines losing millions of dollars a day the FAA 
approved the cockpit security bar as a temporary fix.
Currently Delta is designing, in conjunction with the industry and government 
agencies like NASA, a permanent cockpit door capable of resisting a hijacker determined 
to get at the controls while still remaining permeable to air. Quiello said aeronautical 
engineers are uniquely detail oriented and have been concerned with every imaginable
"Since the 1950s there have been about 50  rapid decom pression incidents on commercial airliners, two  
resulted in the loss o f  the aircraft: On March 3, 1974, 347 passengers were killed when a Turkish D C -10  
crashed after an explosive decom pression severed control cables; and on August 12, 1985 520  passengers 
w ere killed after a pressure bulkhead failed on a Japan Air Lines 747, the worst single aviation accident in 
history. In 1989 an electrical short caused the forward cargo to open on a United Airlines 747 en route from
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particular of the design: “If you ask an engineer to design a secure cockpit door he’ll say, 
‘Okay, how many Newtons does the door need to resist?’ And, ‘What are we designing 
against, a blunt object, ballistics or battering?’ If you say a blunt object, he’ll say, ‘What 
about ballistics?’ And, if you say okay we want to protect against ballistics, he’ll ask, 
‘What kind of gun, at what range and at what caliber?”  The deadline for installation set 
by the FAA is April 2003.
Additionally, Quiello headed a study by the Air Transport Association that 
investigated the use of rapid turns, descent and depressurization as a way for pilots to 
subdue a hijacker. After experimenting with test aircraft and in simulators the AT A 
advised that the techniques only be used with extreme caution. Tests showed performing 
the defensive maneuvers improperly could result in structural failure and loss of control. 
They also warned they could potentially injure passengers trying to prevent a hijacker 
from reaching the pilots.
Another strategy, currently being debated in Congress, is whether or not to arm 
pilots in order to defend cockpits. United Airlines recently trained its pilots in the use of 
“stun-guns” and the Air Line Pilots Association, the union that represents Delta’s 
aviators, came out in favor of arming pilots with lethal weapons after appropriate training 
and certification. Delta has yet to take a corporate position, but Quiello expressed 
concern about introducing firearms to “a gun free environment.” He noted that the guns- 
in-the-cockpit issue is “overwhelmed with emotion.” And that “we [the industry] need to 
think long and hard before putting deadly force in the hands of a pilot.” A pilot in favor 
of the move said “If the U.S. Air Force is prepared to shoot down a jet full of passengers
H onolulu to Sydney, nine passengers were sucked out and lost at sea but som ehow  the pilots managed to 
land safely.
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to prevent another plane from flying into a building it doesn’t seem so drastic, to me, to 
first give pilots a chance to protect their passengers and themselves.”
The job of a commercial airline pilots changed dramatically on Sept. 11. 
Overnight, the planes they love to fly became potential targets for terrorists planning to 
use them as guided missiles. Quiello said that pilots spend their lives preparing for the 
unexpected and the new threats will be taken in stride. But I wanted to see for myself so 
Yates arranged for me to observe a flight simulator lesson in a 767-400, one of Delta’s 
most sophisticated airframes.
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IV. THE VIEW FROM THE COCKPIT
The flight simulator is the backbone of Delta’s training regimen. The company owns 30 
simulators representing each type of aircraft in its fleet and they run around the clock.’ 
The newest simulators cost $5 million each and require a special team of mechanics and 
computer engineers to be on call 24-hours a day in case one breaks. But they allow Delta 
to train pilots with a frequency and in kinds of situations that would be too costly or 
dangerous in a real plane.
I met two instructors and one student co-pilot for a pre-flight briefing in one of 
the small rooms adjacent to the eight 767 and 757 simulators in OC-3. The co-pilot was 
training for his transition from the 767 “Classic” to the “Dash 400,” a bigger and more 
sophisticated version of its predecessor. One of the instructors was there to play the role 
of captain in the simulator or “box,” as the initiated call it. Capt. Mark Bradley was there 
to assess the co-pilot’s performance. The co-pilot looked a little nervous, but Bradley had 
the confident strut of a naval aviator that I had come to recognize growing up around my 
father and his friends. And, when I looked down at his left hand, I saw the big gold ring 
worn by Naval Academy graduates.
Training is the central feature of a commercial airline pilots’ career. Young 
aviators must have attained at least 2,500 flight hours (7-10 years experience) in a branch 
of military aviation or at a smaller carrier before even being considered for a job at a 
major airline like Delta. Pilots are selected based on their experience, airmanship and 
leadership skills. If a pilot lasts D elta’s extensive interview process he must then undergo 
a six-week initial training program in Atlanta. Then he will return at least once a year for
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a week of recurrent training and on average, once every three years for another six-week 
program as he advances in aircraft sophistication and rank. On any given day about 400 
Delta pilots will be participating in classroom, simulator and “line-operating experience” 
training, when a certified captain assesses a pilot during a flight with passengers.**
Bradley began a PowerPoint presentation outlining one of the day’s lessons: 
“Non-Normal Landings.” A non-normal or emergency landing is something pilots 
rehearse over and over, until it becomes second nature. This is because an emergency 
landing may be the most critical moment of a pilot’s career. If a plane loses an engine at 
takeoff, for example, the pilot flying has only fractions of a second to react.^ The 767- 
400 blasts down a runway with more than 30,000 pounds of combined thrust from its two 
engines. When it attains a speed of approximately 150mph (what pilots call V-I speed or 
“the point of no return”) its wings begin to lift off the ground. At this point there is not 
enough runway left to abort the takeoff and the aircraft is thus committed to the sky. 
Immediately, the pilot must compensate for 15,000 pounds of thrust imbalance by 
steering the giant rudder on the plane’s tail with foot pedals and maintain airspeed by 
holding up the throttle for the one remaining engine. Simultaneously, he begins to recite
 ̂D elta’s fleet consists o f  about 600  aircraft, representing 12 different airframes: the Boeing 777, 767-400, 
767-300 , 767-200 , 757, 737-800 , 737-300 , 737-200  and 727-200, and M cDonnell D ouglas’ M D -II , M D ­
BS and M D -90.
*' Line operating checks occur every two years. D elta’s pilot training and standards department consists o f  
148 program instructors like Bradley, 14 crew resource management instructors and 450 line-operating 
check pilots.
 ̂ If the captain is not flying during an engine failure at take-off, the traditional cockpit hierarchy is 
abandoned because there is no time to allow the more experienced pilot to take over the controls from the 
first officer. Therefore, all captains and first officers must be equally proficient in engine failure and 
em ergency landing procedures and instruction manuals describe the flight crew, in this situation, as either 
“the pilot flying ” or “the pilot not fly ing.”
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an emergency landing procedure that he has memorized.'’ Bradley said at moments like 
these a pilot’s training must become instinct to avoid disaster.
First, the pilot flying climbs to 400 feet to buy one or two seconds while telling 
the pilot not flying to “shut down auto-throttles,” “notify tower” and to “start the 
auxiliary power unit.” Then he continues to climb to 1000 feet where he re-configures his 
instruments and maneuvers the plane for immediate landing. Most modem commercial 
aircraft only have two engines so if one fails it’s serious business, and every pilot 
understands his career depends on how effectively he executes a V-1 engine failure 
procedure in the simulator. The student pilot is assessed on how quickly and accurately 
he maintains the appropriate altitude, airspeed and heading. Even slight variations from 
the strict parameters means a failing grade and that he will have to repeat the exercise 
again and again, until he gets it right.
After the briefing, we walked outside the room to a balcony that overlooked the 
plane we would be “flying.” The simulator, a square white box about the size of a large 
passenger van, stood a story tall on top of four hydraulic arms that sway back and forth 
and move up and down mimicking the motion of flight, making the box look something 
like the lunar Lander.
Bradley lowered a steel gangplank to the cockpit door and we all filed in. The 
captain sat down in the left seat, the co-pilot in the right and they both put on radio 
headsets. Bradley sat at a small desk behind the co-pilot with a touch screen computer on
^Bradley said that, in an em ergency, checklist discipline is the m ost important elem ent o f  good airmanship. 
I learned this lesson as a young driver. W hen my father taught me to drive he insisted that I run through a 
safety procedure before leaving the driveway, checking fuel and oil levels, seatbelt security and the tires' 
air pressure. In September o f  1998 he warned me that the rear tire o f  my jeep was low  on air. but in a hurry 
I ignored the safety checklist and drove off. I awoke from a com a a week later to discover that the low tire 
caused me to spin out o f  control and roll at least three tim es on Route I South in Massachusetts.
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top that controlled the simulator. I sat in a chair to the left of the instructor’s position. In 
almost every way the simulator’s cockpit is identical to a real one. The controls are the 
same, the instruments are the same, even the seats adjust in the same way. The 
windscreen is a liquid crystal display, the material used in laptop computers and it wraps 
around the front of the cockpit on three sides for optimal realism.
Bradley entered data into his computer for the lesson. We would take-off from 
runway 15 Right at Boston’s Logan Airport and climb to 19,000 feet where we would 
divert back to Logan for an emergency landing on runway 4 Right. At this early stage in 
the student’s training, Bradley was letting him get used to flying the simulator before he 
threw anything too intense at him.
All of a sudden the scene at Logan’s Terminal C appeared. The tarmac, the gate 
and the fuel trucks were covered with early morning light and looked identical to the ones 
actually used at Logan. Bradley called the pilots on his microphone as though he were an 
air traffic controller with a Boston accent: “Deltah Flight Numbah One you’re ready for 
push-back. Thanks for pahkin in Bahston.” The cockpit rocked a little when the co-pilot 
started to back up. He taxied the plane to a sign that read 15R, pointed us down the 
runway and waited for the okay from the controller. “Deltah Numbah One you are 
cleared for takeoff; have a nice flight,” Bradley said. I slid back in my seat when the 
student pushed up the throttles, blasting us down the runway.
The simulator’s software uses highly detailed information, gathered by special 
mapping satellites, to recreate the little cracks, bumps and dips on every runway in 
Delta’s system. In fact, the sound and motion as we roared down 15 Right was so real I 
had to clutch onto the arm of my seat. Then, the vibrations slowed and finally stopped
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
when the plane lifted off the ground, climbing in a high arch over Boston Harbor. The co­
pilot retracted the landing gear and banked the plane north toward Marblehead, Mass. 
When we reached our cruising altitude Bradley began to fiddle with his computer to show 
me what the simulator could do. With the push of a button he turned dawn to dusk and 
said he could simulate “a bird flying into the windscreen, an engine fire and all types of 
weather, just about anything.”
After a few minutes of practicing steep turns high above the North Shore of 
Massachusetts, the co-pilot called air traffic control to announce that he had an engine 
warning light and needed to land as soon as possible. A list of the nearest suitable 
diversion airports, their distance and the estimated amount of fuel required to get there 
popped up on a computer screen between the captain and co-pilot: Providence, R.I., 
Hartford, Conn., Portsmouth, N.H., Portland, Maine as well as Boston. He entered the 
appropriate data for Logan on a keypad and turned the plane around. We quickly made 
our way south at 350mph descending about 4,000 feet every minute. Soon Boston’s 
skyline and airport came into view.
As we closed in on the runway a pleasant female voice announced the plane’s 
altitude from a speaker in the cockpit every ten feet:”60 feet, 50 feet, 40 feet, 30 feet.. .” 
Now the co-pilot intuited his heading and closing speed, making fine adjustments with 
the yoke and throttles, 4R painted at the front of the approach side of the runway growing 
below us. Then his training became entirely instinct and in the final seconds he gently 
raised the nose, landing 1000 feet down 4 Right and we roared to a stop. Perfect.
At the beginning of the 2002 Delta introduced a new element to its pilot 
simulator-training syllabus: they are now asked to respond to a bomb-scare during a
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practice flight. Pilots are graded on how quickly they get from 35,000 feet to the safety of 
a runway. “We can never totally simulate reality— the fear, the pressure—but we try to 
make our training as close to reality as possible so pilots are as ready as they can be for 
the unexpected,” Bradley said. But preparing for the unexpected at a major airline, as I 
would discover, requires yet another group of highly trained professionals, who toil 
almost perfectly invisible to the passengers they guide in the skies above and help land 
safely on every comer of the earth.
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V. THE VIEW FROM THE GROUND
The bustling floor of the OCC has aptly been described as a cross between NASA’s 
mission control and the floor of the New York Stock Exchange. “Of Delta’s 10,000 type 
A personalities, 9800 are pilots and the other 200 work in here,” said Hank Echols, 
Delta’s unflappable director of flight control, as we stepped out onto the floor.
The facility was dimly lit by the glow of hundreds of computer monitors and 
seven movie theatre-style screens: two of the screens were broadcasting the Weather 
Channel, one had on CNN, another the FOX news network and the remaining three 
displayed Delta’s vital statistics for the day— mechanical, weather and safety concerns 
and the number of flights on time, delayed and cancelled. At the rear of the floor. Delta’s 
17 on-duty aviation meteorologists were busy scribbling on poster-size maps, forecasting 
weather for nearly every region of the globe. And, adjacent to the meteorology 
department is Atlanta Radio, Delta’s central communications system. Through the use of 
satellite technology and strategically placed VHP transmitters, Atlanta Radio can talk to 
pilots anywhere on earth.
The philosophy behind the OCC is to have decision-makers from each of the 
company’s departments and the most advanced aviation support technology together in 
the same room.^ The facility was completed in 1995 at a cost of $30 million and requires 
additional millions annually to keep running around the clock. But it is an investment that 
has paid Delta back in spades, mostly because the OCC helps the airline efficiently 
handle weather delays.
’’ The operation control center consists o f  130 positions, 23 business processes, 18 software applications 
and 17 distinct departments: Flight Control; M eteorology; Radio; Air Logistics; Crew Tracking; Aircraft 
Routing; Airport Customer Service; Reservations; Flight Operations; In-flight Coordination; Material
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Storms cost Delta money, a lot of money. Every time a weather event cripples a 
major airport the repercussions can be felt throughout the airlines’ entire system. If, for 
example, Boston’s Logan Airport is closed because of a surprise winter storm off the 
Massachusetts coast, air-traffic gets jammed up and down the eastern seaboard. All of a 
sudden planes flying into Logan have to divert to other airports or circle at high altitude 
until it is safe to land. Flights that were supposed to connect in Boston to other cities are 
now stuck on the ground or in the air as far away as Atlanta and beyond. This means the 
airline loses money on je t fuel,® revenue, hotel rooms for passengers and crews even on 
the phone-cards it provides to stranded customers. By having flight dispatchers, 
meteorologists, economists and so on together in the same room Delta can predict storms, 
move planes around and make necessary cancellations in one fell swoop. The savings 
after the OCC handled its first major storm; approximately $30 million. The center paid 
for itself in 48 hours.
The central players at the OCC are flight dispatchers. “At Delta we call flight 
dispatchers flight superintendents because, frankly, we expect a little more out of them 
than your average dispatcher,” said Echols who speaks with ill-concealed affection for 
his employees. The airline maintains a staff of 191 flight superintendents who perform a 
wide range of tasks that are critical to the safety of thousands of flights every day. During 
peak operating hours, a superintendent might be responsible for as many as 50 aircraft.
Services; System  Reroute; M aintenance Coordination Center; Structural Engineering; Navigation Data 
Base; Revenue Management; and Corporate Security.
^Aircraft fuel is D elta’s second biggest operating expense after em ployee salaries. The cost o f  fuel is 
dramatic because o f  the enorm ous econom ies o f  scale involved: At a presumed cost o f  $1.00 per gallon and 
assum ing 2 ,200  flight segm ents per day, conserving just one gallon o f  fuel per flight segment translates into 
$803,000  in savings annually.
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They make certain planes have enough reserve fuel,^ they forward changes in weather, 
wind and airport conditions to pilots and they ensure flights operate in compliance with a 
laundry list of company and federal regulations.
In the early days of the aviation industry, before the advent of the flight 
dispatcher, flying was a precarious activity at best. Pilots would take off from dirt 
airstrips carrying mail, passengers and cargo on little more than a wing and a prayer. Few 
pilots used flight plans, little if any weather information was available and if conditions 
changed en route it was up to the pilot to improvise, which often meant setting his plane 
down in a remote field. Many pilots took off never to be heard from again. A. Scott Berg, 
Charles Lindberg’s biographer, writes of Lindberg’s perilous beginnings as an airmail 
carrier in St. Louis;
Navigation was rudimentary at best, with pilots relying on visual contact with the ground— follow ing  
railroad tracks, rivers or at night, the g low  o f  the town below . ‘During the summer months most o f our 
route was covered during daylight,’ Lindberg w ould write, but as winter approached the hours o f  
night fly ing increased until darkness set in a few  hours after w e left St. L ouis.’ DeHavilland planes had 
neither landing lights nor navigation lights. ‘Our total lighting equipm ent,’ Lindberg remembered, 
‘consisted o f  a pocket flashlight (pilot furnished) and a com pass light attached to a button on the end o f  
the stick.’ Lindberg later recounted how he ‘arranged with the mail truck driver to hang four kerosene 
lanterns on fence posts on the leeward side o f  the cow  pasture we used as an airmail field at 
Springfield, as a precaution; and I once had to return and land by the light o f  the two o f them that were 
still burning.’ A s a rule, Lindberg recalled, ‘W e went as far as w e could, and if  the visibility becam e 
too bad w e landed and entrained the m ail.’
As the industry continued to grow so too did its accidents. Eventually, Congress 
grew tired of the increasing loss of life, equipment and cargo and passed the Civil
^Since the cost o f  fuel for jets varies regionally, just as gas does for automobiles, airlines save m oney by 
purchasing fuel at airports where it is least expensive. Delta has a software program that calculates the cost 
o f  buying cheaper fuel at one airport and carrying it to an airport where fuel is more expensive. If it is 
cheaper to transport the fuel (it costs fuel to carry fuel because o f  its weight) then the dispatcher will take 
on extra fuel at airports with bargain prices.
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Aeronautics Act in 1938. The act established a system of checks and balances which 
sought to make flying safer; and one of its key features was the creation of a new licensed 
profession: the aircraft dispatcher. Today, the government requires all U.S. airlines 
operating planes with more than nine seats to maintain flight control centers staffed by 
FAA accredited dispatchers around the world. By federal law, every time a passenger 
plane takes to the skies both the captain in its cockpit and a dispatcher on the ground 
share equal responsibility for the safe completion of the flight. Delta has built on this 
foundation.
When my tour of the OCC was snaking past scores of flight superintendent 
positions spread across the floor, I heard a sound that had been noticeably absent since 
my arrival at headquarters: a woman’s voice. Frances Queenan, one of Delta’s most 
experienced flight superintendents, noticed me as I walked by with my tape recorder and 
asked if I would like to listen in on a conference call with the nation’s 24 air traffic 
control centers.
Not to be confused with flight dispatchers, air traffic controllers are a dedicated 
team of 15,000 federal employees who manage the flow of aircraft through a vast 
network of glassed-in towers, radar installations and control centers. Tower controllers 
give pilots taxiing and takeoff instructions and are responsible for planes inside a 30-mile 
radius of an airport. Outside the tower’s airspace, terminal radar approach controllers 
(TRACON) direct planes until they climb through 18,000 feet where control centers, or 
what Queenan called “fiefdoms” pick up the aircraft.
Every two hours at quarter past the hour controllers update each other on weather 
changes, security issues and the general condition of the nation’s airports. I picked up a
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phone at the position adjacent to Queenan's and listened to each of the country’s centers 
give its region’s status. The reports moved fast one after the other except for Chicago. A 
winter storm had passed through the central-Midwest the night before, closing O ’Hare 
Airport’s runway 22 so flights in Chicago were getting a little backed up. But blue skies 
prevailed over most of the rest of the country and operations were running smoothly. “On 
a busy weather day you can be on that call for 45 minutes, but it was short and sweet 
today because of the fact there isn’t much going on,” Queenan said. My tour continued 
but I asked Queenan if I could come back the next day to watch her work. She agreed.
Queenan grew up in a New York City home filled with talk of planes and radios. 
“Aviation to me is not just something I do for a living; it’s something I ’ve lived my entire 
life,” she said. Her father was a pilot for American Overseas Air Lines beginning in 
1947. In those days aviation was largely the province of young daredevils without wives 
or children, so when Queenan s dad started a family he moved from the cockpit to the 
control tower where he worked until Pan American Airways bought out ADA in 1952.
He then joined the airline’s management, and helped consolidate Pan American’s 
international divisions into one of the world largest corporations. The 1950s were boom 
years for the airline and Queenan’s father often brought home aviators to discuss the 
burgeoning industry.
Queenan tells the story of the Friday afternoon she came home from school to 
find Charles Lindberg eating tuna and noodle casserole at her kitchen table. Lindberg was 
a pathfinder for Pan American in the early 1950s as it expanded into unexplored 
territories around the world and later joined the airline’s board of directors. That night 
Lindberg came to discuss developments in radio communications with Queenan’s dad.
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but after dinner he sat her on his knee and quizzed the schoolgirl about geography. “You 
think you’re an airline brat,” Queenan told me. “I ’m a bigger airline brat.”
O f Delta’s 191 flight superintendents only 11 are women, but even in a world 
dominated by type A personalities and testosterone Queenan’s air of confidence and 
extensive experience commands respect. She followed in her father’s footsteps, 
beginning her career at Pan American in 1967 and climbed the company’s ranks. “1 was a 
crew scheduler, an aircraft scheduler, 1 boarded airplanes, 1 worked system operation 
control, 1 ordered parts, you name it, 1 did it at Pan Am.” Eventually, Queenan earned her 
dispatcher’s license and worked in flight control until Delta bought out the company in 
1991.
The average dispatcher at Delta proved himself with 15 years of supervising 
experience at the company or another major airline (United or American) before even 
being considered for flight superintendent training. A 200-hour dispatcher’s program 
covering all aspects of aviation from meteorology to radio communications at a selective 
aeronautical school followed. And only after passing a grueling exam, administered by 
the FAA, were they awarded their coveted airman’s certificate. Then they are required to 
pass written and oral proficiency examinations at least six times annually. At Delta, a 
dispatcher’s recurrent training is spread out over the calendar and includes a ride in a 
plane’s cockpit to give them first-hand knowledge of life on the other side of their radio.
Additionally, dispatchers are responsible for learning the frequent advances in 
aviation technology, safety and security procedures discussed at workshops and 
published by the government and in professional journals every month.’'* On a moment’s
In M ay the Aircraft Dispatchers Federation w ill hold a workshop discussing the peculiar problem  
volcanic ash poses to aircraft safety. Som etim es when a volcano erupts it sends an enormous cloud o f  fine
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notice, FAA officials have been known to drop in on a dispatcher to administer a pop- 
quiz and have the authority to pull his license on the spot. Not surprisingly, dispatchers 
are well compensated for their efforts and at the major airlines earn salaries up to 
$150,000.
Queenan's position near the front of the floor reflects her extensive experience.
As the Atlanta sector manager she was responsible for the most critical hub in the Delta 
system. Virtually every one of the airlines’ flights has either a direct or indirect 
connection to Atlanta so if planes get backed up in Atlanta Delta gets backed up 
everywhere.
Her workspace consisted of three monitors and a touch-screen computer 
displaying a mind-boggling amount of data. In addition to the Atlanta sector she was 
responsible for Delta’s fleet of aging 727s, about 50 aircraft in all. One monitor had a 
digital map of her region filled with dozens of little gray dots, each representing a Delta 
plane in real time. The other screens listed weather conditions, her planes’ arrival and 
departure times, the altitude airspeed, heading and remaining fuel of the aircraft aloft, 
how much fuel was needed for the planes yet to depart, all her planes’ mechanical 
information and service history, and how many more hours their crews were permitted to 
fly under FAA and contractual guidelines. Flight superintendents communicate updated 
information to pilots via Atlanta Radio, which is channeled through their position phone. 
They can also use the Automated Communication and Report System (ACARS), a coded 
message typed into their keyboard then transmitted to a plane’s onboard computer.
dust into the atmosphere. And, if  the ash is sucked into a hot je t engine, it can melt and then re-harden on 
the turbine’s blades. In 1985 a British Airways 747 flew  into the invisible plume blown from Mount 
Galunggung at 37 ,000 feet over the Pacific Ocean, stalling all four engines. In a remarkable display o f
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After the terrorist attacks a flight superintendent’s job became even more 
complicated. When I arrived at Queenan’s position for the second time her phone was 
buzzing urgently and an orange light was flashing on top of her desk. Because it can get 
so hectic on the floor, superintendents need a way to know with a measure of certainty 
when they have an important phone call. “OCC, Frances Queenan,” she answered.
The call was from a reservations agent in Birmingham, Ala., who was desperately 
trying to reschedule a group of passengers through National Reagan Airport in 
W ashington, D C. But because the airport’s flight paths are only seconds away from so 
many government buildings the airport operates under strict FAA guidelines: every flight 
in and out of National-Reagan has two or more sky marshals— armed federal agents 
trained in close-quarters marksmanship— on board; passengers on National flights are not 
permitted to stand up at the beginning or end portions of the trip; and W ashington’s 
airspace is closely regulated and patrolled by military fighters around the clock.
“We simply can’t do that,” Queenan told the agent. “No, since Sept. 11 we are 
only allowed to operate into Washington-Reagan to and from certain locations for 
security reasons. I ’m sorry, the FAA is not going to change that rule for a group of 38 or 
39 or however many this is.” And that was that.
Although no one ever imagined a catastrophe of such magnitude was possible, 
Delta was not entirely unprepared for Sept. 11, in part because all of the resources at the 
company’s disposal were right there in the OCC. Indeed, from a logistical point of view, 
Sept. 11 was in many ways was like the unpredictable weather events the facility was 
designed for, only much bigger and more intense.
airmanship the pilots were able to re-start an engine after plum m eting 25,000 feet and landed safely in 
Jakarta, Indonesia.
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Suddenly the airline’s operating system, which thrives on forecasting as many 
variables as possible— weather, mechanical problems and cost— was faced with the 
unpredictable. Planes, passengers and crews were stranded at the wrong airports, 
connecting flights were disrupted, accommodations were needed, critical information had 
to be relayed to pilots and financial losses began to mount almost immediately.
Employees said the atmosphere inside the OCC after the second plane hit the 
W orld Trade Center was indescribable. ' I don’t know if words are capable of capturing 
the feeling here that day,” said Frank Crowell, a pilot with the Flight Ops department 
who drove to work right after the attacks. Like so many Americans, Crowell had watched 
United Flight 175 slice into the south tower on television at 9:06a.m." Not only did I 
think that it might have been a Delta plane, I thought there was a good chance I just 
watched someone I knew well die.” he said. The workers at the OCC had little time for 
emotion as they scanned their screens to account for every Delta plane and then to land 
them immediately.
Crowell, who has a special understanding of both the OCC and a cockpit, 
explained that the emergency landing of even a single flight is no small matter. Pilots and 
dispatchers have to choose from a list of diversion airports and have to make 
sophisticated calculations comparing aircraft weight to runway length. Unscheduled 
landings in the middle of a flight are particularly challenging for a pilot because he must 
contend with thousands of tons of unbumed fuel. He can either dump it, delaying the 
landing or touch down “heavy” requiring more runway length to stop and a complete 
structural inspection before the plane is put back into service.
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At the time of the attacks, hundreds of Delta planes, loaded with jet fuel for long 
flights to Salt Lake City and the West Coast, were barely an hour into their journeys; and 
many other flights over the Atlantic were running low on fuel after the previous night’s 
passage. Flight superintendents had to work fast and the OCC provided the perfect 
platform to do it.
Critical information about every airport in the world was available at their 
fingertips as well the technology to communicate with flight crews. When possible, flight 
superintendents directed pilots to on-line airports— which had been meticulously 
inspected by Delta’s own engineers and were equipped with support equipment. Turner 
Delta’s chief flight dispatcher who retired after Sept. 11, decided to inform pilots of the 
attacks after they landed so they could focus on getting their planes down safely, a 
judgment call that would later spur the criticism of many pilots.
After a Washington Post article (“The View from the Ground: Delta’s Reaction to 
Sept. 11 Illustrates the Airline Industry’s Violent Change Dec. 30, 2001) implied Turner 
was “worried about potential panic in the cockpit,” the OCC was bombarded with heated 
calls and letters from pilots who felt they were kept in the dark about the catastrophic 
security breach. Flight superintendents insisted the quote was taken out of context and 
that they merely wanted to limit the tasks of pilots to an already complex list of 
procedures during emergency landings. While most pilots said knowledge of the attacks 
was precisely the kind of information they needed in order to land safely that day. 
W hoever is right, the small controversy illustrates what happens when the trust between a 
pilot and dispatcher is called into question, on either side of the radio.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
32
By 12:00a.m, pilots, dispatchers and air traffic control had coordinated the safe 
landing of Delta’s entire fleet— all but two at on-line airports— a logistical feat unequaled 
in the history of aviation. But later that afternoon, when Queenan began her shift, the 
OCC was still buzzing. She was immediately bombarded with frantic calls, even as she 
noted that for the first time in her career her screens were blank, with no civil aircraft 
aloft. She spent the afternoon answering questions from family and co-workers trying to 
get information about the safety of Delta’s planes, reservations agents who needed 
updates for bewildered passengers and from pilots, some stranded in places like Gander, 
who needed to know when it was safe to come home. All the while she was fearing for 
the lives of close childhood friends in New York City, one of whom she later discovered 
was of the firemen killed at the World Trade Center.
From the morning of Sept. 11 until Delta’s last aircraft was recovered from the 
Canadian Maritimes five days later nearly 1,000 employees manned Flight Ops and the 
OCC. Flight superintendent’s spent the next three weeks re positioning Delta’s aircraft, 
scheduling in-service inspections for the hundreds of jets that landed heavy on Sept. 11, 
implementing new security procedures and bringing balance back to the airline’s 
operating system. “Dispatchers are selected because they think well inside the box but 
also because, when they have to, they do just as good a job thinking outside the box,’’ 
Queenan said.
After the attacks, new technology and training were put in place at the OCC. A 
position for a corporate security representative was added to coordinate the many security 
regulations handed down by the company and the newly created Transportation Safety 
Administration. Also, the flight control director runs frequent drills to rehearse for an
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emergency response; and new software allows flight superintendents to simultaneously 
send an emergency message on ACARS to every Delta cockpit. On Sept. 11, 
superintendents had to type out a code specific to each aircraft separately.
None of the employees I spoke to at Delta have any illusions that their company 
did something special to avoid a hijacking on Sept. 11. It may have simply been chance 
that a Delta airliner wasn’t attacked. It may have been that the terrorists felt Delta, a name 
that the reflects the airline’s origins as a crop dusting outfit on the Mississippi Delta, 
didn’t pack the same symbolic punch as United or American. But like the industry 
leaders. Delta is left trying to close the security holes that led to the Sept. 11 attacks.
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VI. THE WEAKEST LINK: AIRPORT SECURITY
Logistically a fail-safe security system is probably impossible. The airlines spent the past 
few years attracting customers with cheap tickets and improved traveling convenience. A 
new security procedure that adds thirty seconds to the screening time of every passenger 
would delay the boarding of a full 767-400 by nearly three hours. Reforms that 
overwhelm the already overstressed air travel system would drive passengers away by the 
millions. And Israeli terrorism expert Ariel Merari reminds us, in the recent book 
“Aviation Terrorism and Security,” airport security can only go so far:
The security system  w as caught by surprise when an airliner was first hijacked for political extortion; it 
was unprepared when an airliner was attacked on the tarmac by a terrorist team firing automatic 
weapons; when terrorists, w ho arrived as passengers collected  their luggage from the conveyer belt, 
took out weapons from  their suitcases, and strafed the crowed in the arrivals hall; when a parcel bomb 
sent by mail exploded in an airliner’s cargo hold mid-flight; when a bomb was brought on board by an 
unwitting passenger...T he history o f  attacks on aviation is the chronicle o f  a cat-and-mouse game, 
where the cat is busy blocking old holes and the m ouse alw ays succeeds in finding new ones.
And no whole was bigger than the one the terrorists found on Sept. 11.
First, they well understood the weakness of security checkpoint screening. Before 
the attacks, airport screening nationwide was contracted to private companies with poorly 
trained and paid workers. It was later revealed, however, that nine of the 19 hijackers on 
Sept. 11 were brought back for additional inspection before being finally being allowed 
to board planes with small knives and box-cutters hidden in their hand luggage. So the 
problem was not just a lack of expertise, but the difficulty of detecting something small 
weapons. Even under close scrutiny an X-ray picture of a knife blade turned edge-side 
forward looks like a thin line and a box-cutter—jumbled together with pens, pencils, 
rulers and calculators— seems similarly innocuous.
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Second, the terrorists knew if they got weapons through security there was 
another loophole— in the psychology of passengers and crew. They gambled that 
passengers would think their plane was being hijacked for money or political ransom. 
They may have also known that in hijacking situations pilots had been instructed by the 
FAA to cooperate with the attackers in order to get their plane on the ground as soon as 
possible, where law enforcement can negotiate. Only the Sept. 11 terrorists had no 
intention of bargaining for money, political ransom or anything else.
Cockpit voice recordings and cell phone calls from the hijacked planes illustrate 
the calculated nature of the attacks. On some of the flights terrorists rushed the cockpits, 
probably overcoming pilots by knocking them unconscious or slitting their throats. On 
other flights, terrorists lured the cockpit door open by savagely cutting flight attendants 
and passengers in the cabin then they attacked the cockpit. On all of the flights a group of 
terrorists played crowd control, herding passengers to the rear of the planes to prevent 
them from assisting the crew.
Passengers on United Flight 175 and American Airlines Flights 11 and 77, 
although terrified probably thought they would eventually land and be released. After the 
passengers on United Flight 93 learned that the three planes had flown into the World 
Trade Center and Pentagon on cell phone calls they rushed the terrorists. Flight 93 
crashed in Shanks ville, Pennsylvania at 10:37a.m, short of its intended target, which very 
well may have been the White House. Flight 93 marked a turning point in the psychology 
of American aviation: never again will flight crews and passengers acquiesce to 
hijackers, now that they know their own lives and the lives of thousands on the ground 
may be at stake. That’s why tragedy was avoided several months after Sept. 11 when the
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so-called shoe-bomber Richard Reid tried to light explosives on a trans-Atlantic flight 
and was subdued by a flight attendant and several passengers. But we are still left with 
the challenge of screening millions of passengers and pieces of luggage every day for 
weapons and explosives.
After Sept. 11 the government created the Transportation Safety Administration 
to handle airport security with a 60,000-strong force of well trained and paid federal 
employees. The airlines are now also required to “match” every bag put in the belly of a 
plane with a passenger on board, eliminating the possibility a terrorist will check a bag 
full of explosives and make a run for it. Additionally, bomb-sniffing dogs and machines 
scour luggage, passengers and airports for explosives.
The airlines also have in place a system that efficiently determines the risk posed 
by passengers. When a ticket is purchased the CAPPS— Computer-Assisted Passenger 
Prescreening System— assesses the customer on a variety of criteria. The exact 
information used is classified but probably includes the passenger’s address, credit and 
travel history, whether the ticket was paid for in cash, if it is one way, if the passenger is 
traveling alone and so on. A recent review by the Department of Justice acknowledged 
that the approximately 50 pieces of data used by CAPPS do not discriminate on the bases 
of ethnicity. A 50-year-old stockbroker from New York City, for example, who has 
traveled on my fathers’ shuttle flight from LaGuardia to National-Reagan twice a week 
for the past decade will breeze through security. But a few passengers deemed high-risk 
will have their bags examined again and may be asked to undergo individual screening.
And there is another effective strategy used by the airlines today that most 
passengers will never see but provides an important defense against an attack— sudden
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changes in security levels, procedures and routines that respond to information about 
heightened threats gathered by intelligence services and deny a would-be hijacker a 
measure of certainty.
Can the airlines close the holes that led to the Sept. 11 attack? Historically, the 
industry has done a very good job preventing mechanical and weather related accidents.
It is also very good at training individuals to execute those procedures under the most 
stressful situations imaginable. That’s why the odds of being involved in a fatal aviation 
at an airline with a safety record like Delta are around 1 in 12.4 million. It is clear that the 
new training and technology has made airport security better today than ever before. But 
screening hundreds of thousands of bags and passengers every day places enormous 
psychological demands on the airport security system. The success security operators 
have in preventing another tragedy thus may rely on something more difficult to 
implement than better technology and training.
Before I left the OCC to board a Delta 767-400 to Salt Lake City on my way 
home I asked Queenan how she performs so well under pressure day after day without 
cracking. She credited success in her profession to the attitude of flight superintendents, 
one we often trust in but rarely see and that allows ordinary people do extraordinary 
things: “What is it those astronauts sa id .. .Yes, that’s it. In this business failure is not an 
option.” Aviation was founded by that attitude. And, after Sept. 11, it can advance only 
by that attitude.
Such an attitude does come from security workshops or sophisticated computer 
systems. It is not handed down by the federal government or bolstered by new uniforms 
and bigger paychecks. It comes from a commitment that is socially established over
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lifetimes of experience and challenges— a commitment to excellence and order that is 
handed down to young people by older people whom they respect and trust. It might be 
by that measure of character, rather than economics or technology, through which we 
make our skies safe again.
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SOURCES
Because this is meant as a magazine piece, not a newspaper or scholarly article, I 
have avoided using citations and mentioning, in the body of the text, some of the names 
of the people I have interviewed or the books and articles I have read and relied on for 
my information. I owe them all many thanks. Additionally, I am confident I was able to 
reconstruct an accurate chronology of the events of Sept. 11, as they unfolded at Delta, by 
interviewing employees from many of the company’s departments who were working 
independently of each other that day and by pulling up the company’s records of flights. 
Interviews also allowed me to cross-reference accounts for inaccuracies, and many 
articles from major news outlets allowed me another way of verifying exact times and 
facts. So many people so generously gave of their time and knowledge to help me with 
this project it is hard to believe there would be any mistakes, if there are, they have been 
furnished exclusively by me.
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